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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. Relief should be
granted because Mr. Padilla proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was
denied constitutionally effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to file a
motion to suppress that would have resulted in the suppression of all the evidence
against Mr. Padilla.

B. Procedural and Factual History
Per the affidavit of Officer Matthew Gonzales, Mr. Padilla's case began in
this way:
On 08/07/2009, at approximately 0232 hours, I was traveling
eastbound in the alley between 5 th Avenue East and 6 th Avenue East in
the 400 block. As I was driving I noticed a male walking southbound
on Ketchum Street. When the male noticed my marked police vehicle
he started running. I got out of my vehicle and yelled for the male to
stop running. The male continued running and was jumping fences
during this time I was yelling for him to stop running. The male,
identified as Tarango Deforest Padilla, was later caught laying in some
bushes at the intersection of 5 th Avenue East and Blue Lakes
Boulevard, in the City and County of Twin Falls, State of Idaho.
Padilla was detained until it could be determined why he had run. In
a search of the area where the male was lying, I located two financial
transaction cards and $458.00 dollars. Also laying in the area were
some small ceramic pieces of a spark plug, which through my training
and experience as a police officer I identified as a tool used to easily
break vehicle windows. More ceramic pieces of the spark plug were
located in Padilla's jacket pocket. I know these items are often used to
burglarize vehicles. All of the items that were located in the bushes
were clean and appeared to have just been placed there. A search of
Padilla's person produced 15 peach colored pills with Watson 3203
stamped on it. These pills were identified using the Drug Bible as
Hydrocodone Biturate, which is a schedule III controlled substance.
The pills were not in a prescription bottle and Padilla did not have a

prescription for the pills. Two other financial transaction cards were
also located on Padilla's person. A small red flashlight was located in
one of the yards that I chased Padilla through.
Padilla was placed under arrest for possession of a financial
transaction card, possession of a controlled substance and possession of
burglary tools and transported to the Twin Falls County Jail. At the
jail I was informed that Padilla had a warrant out of Twin Falls
County. I informed Padilla that he was also going to be booked on the
warrant. Padilla stated that was the reason that he ran in the first
place. After advising Padilla of his Miranda Warnings I asked Padilla
how many cars he had gotten into and he stated that he had not
broken into any cars. I asked him how he came to be in possession of
financial transaction cards that were not his and he stated that he had
found them on the ground. Padilla was booked in for possession of
financial transaction cards, controlled substance, and burglary tools
and the warrant.
State's Ex. 1, D 27, Ex. Disc, pp. 71-72.
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At trial, Officer Gonzales testified that Officer Schlund, who had arrived to
assist him in chasing Mr. Padilla, reached Mr. Padilla first and "detained" him
"with handcuffs." At that point, the police did a quick pat down for weapons. And,
then, Officer Schlund directed Officer Gonzales to the place where Mr. Padilla had
been captured. In that place, Officer Gonzales found ceramic pieces from a spark
plug, some financial transaction cards, and some money. Officer Gonzales then
searched Mr. Padilla and found more pieces of spark plug, two more financial

Officer Gonzales' testimony at the preliminary hearing was consistent with
his affidavit. In that testimony, he stated that he was in his police car in an alley
with his lights off when he saw Mr. Padilla. He watched Mr. Padilla enter the
alley, turned on his lights, drove toward Mr. Padilla, and Mr. Padilla turned and
looked and then left the alley and started to run. Officer Gonzales followed Mr.
Padilla with his car, then got out of the car, ordered Mr. Padilla to stop and then
chased him on foot. State's Ex. 5, Ex. Disc pp. 94-97.
1
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transaction cards, and some pills. The cards found on Mr. Padilla bore the name
Jamie Labrum. Cards found on the ground bore the names of Savannah Davis and
Thomas Mauch. State's Ex. 15, Ex. Disc pp. 205-206.
The state charged Mr. Padilla in two separate cases with theft for possession
of a financial transaction card (Jamie Labrum's card and Thomas Mauch's card).
State's Ex. 3 and 4, Ex. Disc, pp. 83-90. The State later added a persistent violator
enhancement. State's Ex. 7 and 8, Ex. Disc, pp. 119-127.
Defense counsel did not file a motion to suppress all the evidence obtained
pursuant to the unconstitutional Terry stop, the subsequent unconstitutional
search, and unconstitutional arrest following the unconstitutional search. R 4 7-48,
225-226. The State tried the consolidated cases before a jury. Mr. Padilla was
convicted and sentenced to two concurrent terms of 15 years (7 years fixed followed
by 8 indeterminate). State's Ex. 11 and 12, Ex. Disc, pp. 167-176. The District
Court later denied Mr. Padilla's Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence.
State's Ex. 17-19, Ex. Disc, pp. 377-391.
Mr. Padilla appealed and the Court of Appeals denied relief in an
unpublished opinion. State v. Padilla, S.Ct. Nos. 38899/38900, filed December 28,
2012. State's Ex. 22, Ex. Disc, pp. 428-433.
Mr. Padilla filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel, including ineffective assistance in failing to file a
motion to suppress. R 13-21, 191-199. Appointed counsel filed an amended petition
which also raised the claim of ineffective assistance in failing to file a motion to
3

suppress. R 53-58, 232-237.
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Padilla testified that when he was walking
that morning, a vehicle with its headlights off drove toward him at a rate of speed
that startled him. Fearing that he was going to be jumped, he ran. EH Tr. p. 38,
ln. 19-p. 41, ln. 5. Mr. Padilla testified that he believed the stop and the subsequent
search violated his constitutional rights. EH Tr. p. 42, ln. 13-p. 43, ln. 17.
The District Court denied relief. R 156-166, 288-298. With regard to the
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to file a motion to suppress, the
Court wrote: "Even assuming that there was no basis for a Terry stop/frisk as
Padilla suggests, police would have had the right to search him following his arrest
on the warrant. This doctrine coupled with the inevitable discovery doctrine would
have resulted in denial of any suppression motion." R 162, 294.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in
concluding that the evidence would have been admissible even if the investigatory
stop was unlawful. Padilla v. State, 158 Idaho 184, 191, 345 P.3d 243, 250 (Ct. App.
2014). The Court vacated the judgment denying post-conviction relief and
remanded for factual findings regarding the stop of Mr. Padilla. The Court further
held that the District Court "may also make conclusions of law including (a)
whether it would have been objectively reasonable for defense counsel to file a
motion to suppress, arguing that officers lacked reasonable suspicion under the
totality of the circumstances, and (b) whether there is a reasonable probability that
the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had counsel filed a motion
4

to suppress. Id.
The State sought Supreme Court review which was denied. Padilla u. State,
No. 41772/41773 - Respondent's Petition for Review filed 1/7/15; Remittitur entered
4/6/15.
On remand, the District Court did not hold a hearing. R 5.
The District Court entered the following findings of fact:
Near 2 A.M. on the date of his arrest Padilla left the home of an
acquaintance to walk to his home approximately two blocks away. As
he walked down an alleyway he heard a vehicle come at him at a 'rate
of speed that startled' him. That vehicle was in fact a police cruiser.
The police car, operated by Officer Gonzales, did not initially have its
headlights or overhead lights on. The police officer was 'patrolling' the
alley way as part of his regular duties. Gonzales observed that Padilla
was 'shuffling' and doing some 'fumbling around'. Gonzales turned on
his headlights, but not his overhead lights. He turned his vehicle so
that Padilla could see that it was a clearly marked police car. Padilla
'turned and looked' at Gonzales as he was getting out of police car.
Padilla thought that he was going to 'get jumped' by someone and
began running. Gonzales shouted at Padilla several times to stop.
Padilla didn't hear the officer say stop. Rather, he continued running.
He jumped over a fence and twisted his ankle and fell in some bushes.
As he lay in the bushes after he fell, he 'tossed everything that [he]
thought [he] didn't want found on [him] in the bushes.' These items
included a credit card and pieces of a spark plug.
Another police officer, Office Schlund, heard Gonzales radio call for
assistance and located Padilla where he had fallen. He was
immediately handcuffed. He was patted down for weapons but no
weapons were found. While Padilla was detained by other officers,
Gonzales searched the area where Padilla had been. He found a credit
card belonging to Mr. Mauch, some money, and some ceramic pieces
from a spark plug. Gonzales knew based upon his training and
experience that spark plugs can be used to break windows on
automobiles. All of these found items 'were clean and appeared to
have just been placed there.' Gonzales then searched Padilla's person
without a warrant and found two credit cards belonging to Ms. Labrum
and some more pieces of a spark plug. The three credit cards and the
5

spark plug pieces from Padilla's person were admitted as evidence at
trial. The pieces of the spark plug found on the ground were also
admitted. After finding these items Gonzales retraced the direction
that Padilla came from and found a flashlight in the yard that he
chased Padilla through. This item was also admitted at trial.
R 130-131 (footnotes omitted).
The District Court also entered its conclusions of law:
1. The court would not have granted a motion to suppress because Mr.

Padilla abandoned the credit cards and pieces of spark plug found near
him and the abandonment was not the result of illegal police conduct.
2. The investigative detention was proper based upon Mr. Padilla's
unprovoked flight. The court acknowledged Mr. Padilla's testimony
that he did not realize his pursuer was the police and he ran because
he was afraid of being jumped. However, the court found this
testimony incredible because Mr. Padilla also testified that once he
had fallen he decided to toss everything which he did not want found
upon him. The court concluded that Mr. Padilla's flight was casual
rather than coincidental, shows a consciousness of guilt, and justifies
an investigatory detention.
3. The search of Padilla's person was proper because at the time he
was searched, there was probable cause to arrest him for either
burglary or possession of a stolen credit card based upon the discovery
of the card or cards and spark plug parts on the ground.
132-136.
The District Court entered its amended judgment and this appeal timely
follows. R 138-142.

III. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the District Court err in denying Mr. Padilla's petition for post-conviction
relief because trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to suppress
unconstitutionally obtained evidence?

6

IV. ARGUMENT
A. The District Court erred - the evidence against Mr. Padilla was
obtained in violation of the state and federal constitutions and counsel
was ineffective in failing to move to suppress
l. Standard of Review

In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner must
prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. When
reviewing a decision denying post-conviction relief after an evidentiary
hearing, an appellate court will not disturb the lower court's factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. The credibility of the
witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences
to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely withing the
province of the district court. We exercise free review of the district
court's application of the relevant law to the facts.

Padilla, 158 Idaho at 186, 345 P.3d at 245 (citations omitted).
2. Law of the Case
In its opinion remanding this case, the Court of Appeals stated that the law
to be applied to determine whether Mr. Padilla is entitled to relief on his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is "(a) whether it would have been objectively
reasonable for defense counsel to file a motion to suppress, arguing that officers
lacked reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances, and (b) whether
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have
been different had counsel filed a motion to suppress." Padilla, 158 Idaho at 192,
345 P.3d at 250.
The State filed a petition for review and in its brief in support argued that
this is an incorrect statement of the law -- that the standard is whether it was
7

objectively unreasonable for counsel to fail to file a motion to suppress.
Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, filed February 17, 2015, p. 21,
ftnt. 5. The Supreme Court denied the State's petition.
Mr. Padilla agrees with the State that the Court of Appeals' statement of the
law sets a new standard more favorable to petitioners than the Strickland standard.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).
The law of the case doctrine states that when "upon an appeal, the Supreme
Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law
necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and
must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and
upon subsequent appeal ... " State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 72, 305 P.3d 513, 516
(2013), quoting Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1283 (2001)

(Stuart IV), in turn quoting Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P.3d 973,
976 (2000).
The statement of the law in the Court of Appeals' decision was clearly
necessary to its decision. However, Mr. Padilla recognizes that in Stuart IV, the
Supreme Court held that language in Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 935, 801 P.2d
1283, 1286 (1990) (Stuart III), was not the law of the case because the Supreme
Court had provided little discussion as to why it used the language it did and
because the Court could not presume that it had excluded certain exceptions
allowing admission of illegally obtained attorney-client conversations allowed in
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other states. Likewise in Hawhins, the Supreme Court held that the law of the case
doctrine would not be applied to language for which there was no legal analysis.
155 Idaho at 73, 305 P.3d at 517.
In an abundance of caution, this brief will address application of both the law
of this case (objectively reasonable to file a motion to suppress) and the Strichland
standard (objectively unreasonable to fail to file a motion to suppress).
3. Argument
The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded this case for findings of fact
regarding the stop of Mr. Padilla. The Court also advised that the District Court
could also enter conclusions of law regarding whether it would have been objectively
reasonable for counsel to file a motion to suppress and whether there was a
reasonable probability of a different outcome if counsel had filed a motion to
suppress. The District Court made its findings and concluded that counsel was not
ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress because the motion would not have
been granted. The Court thus denied post-conviction relief. The District Court's
conclusions of law were incorrect and this Court should now reverse and grant postconviction relief.
The Fourth Amendment as applied to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment and Idaho Constitution Art. I, § 17 protect against unreasonable
searches and seizures. When a seizure occurs without a warrant, the government
bears the burden of proving facts necessary to establish an exception to the warrant
requirement. Coolidge v. New Harnpshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032
9

~)71); State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 570, 328 P.3d 548, 550 (Ct. App. 2014).
An exception to the warrant requirement exists when an officer has a
reasonable suspicion that a criminal act has occurred or is occurring. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968). The stop "is permissible if it is based
upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is,
has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." Padilla, 158 Idaho at 188,
345 P.3d at 247.
As noted by the Court of Appeals in the previous appeal in this case, while
the United States Supreme Court has addressed a situation involving flight and the
impact of flight in a reasonable suspicion analysis in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119, 120 S.Ct. 673 (2000), prior to Mr. Padilla's case the Idaho appellate courts had
not applied the analysis in a published decision. Padilla, 158 Idaho at 190, 345
P.3d at 249. As a matter of first impression in Padilla, the Court of Appeals set out
the Wardlow holding which declined to adopt per se rules regarding flight, but
retained the totality of the circumstances analysis. The Court of Appeals further
noted that post-Wardlow, courts have considered how flight factors into reasonable
suspicion and developed competing rationales to hold that flight alone is sufficient
or insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion. 158 Idaho at 188-89, 345 P.3d at
248-49. The Court of Appeals cited State v. Kreps, 650 N. W.2d 636 (Iowa 2002),
with approval. Kreps held that "the key is that the relationship between the police
presence and the suspect's flight was causal rather than coincidental." Kreps, 650
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N.W.2d at 644 (citing Smith u. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 316 (D.C. 1989)).

Padilla, supra.
The Court of Appeals also noted that whether reasonable suspicion exists
must be determined in light of the totality of the circumstances confronting the
officer at the time the decision to stop is made. Id., citing United States u. Aruizu,
534 U.S. 266, 272, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750 (2002); Lewis u. State, 504 S.E.2d 732, 734
(Ga. App. 1998) ("'[t]he question of whether reasonable suspicion exists to stop a
vehicle must be measured by current knowledge' that is, at the moment the stop is
made and not in hindsight").

Kreps sets out a concise protocol for weighing flight in the totality of the
circumstances analysis:
For flight to constitute grounds for suspicion, the circumstances
surrounding the suspect's efforts to avoid the police must be such as to
allow a rational conclusion that flight indicated a consciousness of
guilt. Such a conclusion can only be drawn if there is evidence
permitting a reasonable inference that (1) the suspect knew the police
were present and (2) the police believed that the suspect was aware of
the police presence.
650 N.W.2d at 644 (citations omitted).

Kreps went on to note that a suspect's actions and statements after he/she is
seized indicating an intent to avoid the police "plainly cannot serve as one of the
circumstantial facts from which the presence of reasonable suspicion is to be
determined." Id., quoting United States u. Jones, 619 F.2d 494, 498 (5 th Cir. 1980).
What is relevant is what the officer knew at the time of the seizure, not what he/she

11

learned after the fact. Id.
Applying the Wardlow and Kreps analysis to this case, the conclusion must
be that the police violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Art. I, § 13
in seizing Mr. Padilla. To use flight as a ground for suspicion to support the
seizure, the State had the burden to show that (1) Mr. Padilla knew the police were
present; and (2) that the police believed that he was aware of their presence. Yet,
the District Court's findings of fact do not support a conclusion that the state met
its burden.
The District Court found:
1) The events happened at 2:00 a.m., two blocks from Mr. Padilla's home;

2) Officer Gonzales did not activate his overhead lights;
3) Officer Gonzales turned his vehicle so that Mr. Padilla "could see" that it
was a marked car;
4) Mr. Padilla turned and looked at Officer Gonzales as he exited the car;
5) Mr. Padilla thought he was going to "get jumped" by someone and so he
ran;
6) Mr. Padilla did not hear Officer Gonzales tell him to stop;
7) Mr. Padilla jumped over a fence and twisted his ankle and fell in some
bushes;
8) As he lay in the bushes, Mr. Padilla tossed some items in the bushes;
9) Officer Schlund found Mr. Padilla and immediately handcuffed him;
10) Mr. Padilla was patted down for weapons, but none were found;
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11) Officer Gonzales searched the area and found a credit card, some money,
some ceramic pieces from a spark plug;
12) Officer Gonzales then searched Mr. Padilla without a warrant and found
two credit cards belonging to Ms. Labrum and more pieces of spark plug;
13) Officer Gonzales later found a flashlight in a yard Mr. Padilla had passed
through.
R 130-31.
These findings of fact do not support a conclusion that Mr. Padilla knew the
police were present or that the police believed that Mr. Padilla was aware of their
presence.
A finding that Mr. Padilla "could have" seen the police car is not the same as
a finding that he did see the car and recognized it as such. This is especially true in
this case which happened in a dark alley at night. There was no evidence that the
police cruiser was positioned under a light so that it could be identified. And,
further, a finding that Mr. Padilla turned and looked at Officer Gonzales is not the
same as a finding that Mr. Padilla recognized Officer Gonzales as a police officer.
Again, there is no finding that the light was sufficient to make such an
identification. Moreover, the Court did find that Mr. Padilla did not hear Officer
Gonzales tell him to stop. And, the Court found that Mr. Padilla believed that he
was going to be jumped by someone. 2

In its conclusions of law, the District Court used Mr. Padilla's statements
post-arrest to conclude that he did know that the police were chasing him. R 133-34.
2
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Mr. Padilla's flight cannot be considered as a factor supporting a reasonable
suspicion in this case because the District Court did not find that Mr. Padilla knew
that he was being pursued by the police. Likewise, the Court did not find that
Officer Gonzales believed that Mr. Padilla knew that he was a police officer. Kreps,

supra.
Absent the flight, all that supports a reasonable suspicion is Mr. Padilla's
presence in his own neighborhood at 2:00 a.m. and his "shuffling" and "fumbling."
Mr. Padilla has searched the record and cannot find any statement anywhere from
Officer Gonzales that Mr. Padilla was "shuffling." But, even assuming Mr. Padilla
was shuffling, whatever that means, and fumbling in his own neighborhood in the
night, that is not indicative of a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal
activity. And, certainly, "fumbling" without "shuffling" in one's own neighborhood,
even at night, is not indicative of criminal activity. See, LaFave 104 Search &
Seizure § 9.5(e)(5th ed.) ("[F]or suspicion of burglary of residential premises,
something more than presence in immediate proximity to those premises will
ordinarily be required, for persons have occasion to enter and exit their residence at
all hours.")
In reviewing this case, this Court should also be aware that the District

However, as noted in Kreps, supra, and Jones, supra, a suspect's actions after the
fact "plainly cannot serve as one of the circumstantial facts from which the
presence of reasonable suspicion is to be determined." What is relevant is what the
officer knew at the time of the seizure, not what he/she learned after the fact.
14

Court, in its conclusions of law, noted that "The officers in this case had no
knowledge of any specific criminal activity the area, such as car burglaries or thefts.
Gonzales only observed that Padilla fled upon his approach. Thus the issue here is
whether that flight would justify an investigatory stop." R 133. The District
Court's conclusion that flight alone is sufficient to support the stop narrows the
right to privacy as recognized by Wardlow. In Wardlow, the Supreme Court
rejected Illinois' request for "a bright-line rule authorizing the temporary detention
of anyone who flees at the mere sight of a police officer." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 127,
120 S.Ct. at 677, as quoted in Padilla, 158 Idaho at 189, 345 P.3d at 248.
This Court also indicated its intent to reject an expansion of Wardlow under
a federal constitutional analysis to establish flight alone as sufficient to allow an
investigatory stop. 158 Idaho at 189-191, 345 P.3d at 248-250. However, even if
this Court was to now backtrack and find that Wardlow can be so expanded under
the Fourth Amendment, this Court should hold that the Idaho Constitution is more
protective of individual privacy rights and reject the standard that flight alone is
sufficient to allow an investigatory stop under the state constitution.
Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution may be and has been read
independently from the Fourth Amendment. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988,
842 P.2d 660, 668 (1992). In fact, Idaho's constitution provides greater protection to
individual privacy than does the Fourth Amendment. State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho
7 46, 760 P.2d 1162 (1988); State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462, 943 P.2d 52 (1997);

15

Guzman, supra.
In Webb, a broader definition of curtilage than that applied under the Fourth
Amendment was adopted under the state constitution because of differences in
custom and terrain unique to Idaho and Idahoans greater reasonable expectations
of privacy. 130 Idaho at 466-67, 943 P.2d at 56-57. In Guzman, the federal good
faith exception to the warrant requirement was rejected because in Idaho the
exclusionary rule is a constitutionally mandated remedy for illegal searches and
seizures which goes not only to deter police misconduct but also to prevent the
courts from making an independent constitutional violation in using the tainted
evidence thus impinging on the integrity of the courts. 122 Idaho at 992, 842 P.2d
at 671. And, in Thompson, the Supreme Court concluded that even if there is not a
federally recognized legitimate expectation of privacy in telephone numbers dialed,
in Idaho there is a legitimate expectation of privacy. 114 Idaho at 749-50, 760 P.2d
at 1165-66. "[Article] 1, § 17 will stand as a bulwark against the intrusions of pen
registers into our daily life in Idaho." 114 Idaho at 751, 760 P.2d 1167.
While it may be that under the federal constitution flight without more will
eventually be held by the United States Supreme Court to be cause for an
investigatory stop, Idahoans have greater privacy expectations and protections.
Idahoans expect to be able to walk on the public streets and alleyways without
having to speak to police if they do not wish to - even if that means walking or even
running away. Flight alone should not be a sufficient cause for an investigatory
stop under the state constitution.
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Given the District Court's findings of fact, the conclusion that the
mvestigatory stop was appropriate was incorrect. In fact, the investigatory stop of
Mr. Padilla was unconstitutional and all evidence obtained as a result would have
been subject to suppression.
The District Court further concluded that the card, spark plug pieces, and
flashlight would have been nonetheless admissible because Mr. Padilla abandoned
them. This conclusion is likewise incorrect.
The District Court found that Mr. Padilla jumped over a fence, twisted his
ankle and fell in some bushes. As he lay in the bushes, he tossed away the card,
spark plug pieces, and flashlight. R 130.

California u. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (1991), holds that a
seizure does not occur until the citizen either submits to the officer's show of
authority or there is an application of physical force. 111 S.Ct. at 1550-52. Items
discarded prior to the seizure are abandoned and not protected by the Fourth
Amendment. Id. See also, State u. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431, 146 P.3d 697 (Ct. App.
2006). However, items discarded as the result of illegal police conduct are not
voluntarily abandoned and are fruit of the poisonous tree. State u. Harwood, 133
Idaho 50, 52, 981 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Ct. App. 1999), citing United States u. Roman,
849 F.2d 920, 923 (5 th Cir. 1988); United States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041, 1045 (6 th
Cir. 1982).
In this case, the District Court found that Mr. Padilla fell into the bushes. It
did not find that he was continuing to attempt to evade after the fall by hiding or
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continuing to run on his twisted ankle. Rather, the Court found that he lay in the
bushes. This was a submission to Officer Gonzales. The tossing of the items
occurred after the submission, not before. Therefore, the tossing of the items was
not a voluntary abandonment and the items were suppressible. Harwood, supra.
Further, the District Court erred in concluding that the search of Mr.
Padilla's person after the card and spark plug pieces were found on the ground was
constitutional because at that point the police had probable cause to arrest for
burglary or possession of a stolen credit card. R 136.
The District Court erred in this analysis because the officers would have
never found the card and spark plug pieces on the ground but for the
unconstitutional seizure of Mr. Padilla. And, no intervening circumstances
sufficiently attenuated or cured the earlier misconduct. See State v. Malad, 140
Idaho 817, 103 P.3d 430 (2004), holding that discovery of an outstanding warrant
after the seizure of evidence did not dissipate the taint of an officer's illegal entry
into the defendant's home. Since the police would have never discovered the
evidence the District Court found provided probable cause for an arrest and search
incident thereto but for their illegal activity, the evidence obtained in the search of
Mr. Padilla was subject to suppression.
Further, even if the evidence in the bushes was admissible in Count II, Count
I would have been dismissed due to lack of evidence. And, without the evidence
that Mr. Padilla possessed the Labrum card on his person, the State would not have
been able to link him to the Mauch card in the bushes. (Mr. Padilla's testimony at
18

the motion to suppress would not have been admissible at trial. Sinunons u. United

States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 975 (1968).
Whether this Court applies the standard that counsel's performance was
deficient because it would have been objectively reasonable to file a motion to
suppress or the standard that it would have been objectively unreasonable to fail to
file a motion to suppress, counsel's actions in failing to file the motion were deficient
performance. It would have been reasonable to file a motion to suppress because it
would have been successful and it was unreasonable to fail to file a motion because
the motion would have been successful - if not in the District Court, then
eventually on appeal.
Further, it is reasonably probable that had the motion been filed the outcome
of the proceedings would have been different. Had the motion been filed, there
would have been no evidence against Mr. Padilla and he would not have been
convicted.
Having proven both deficient performance and prejudice, Mr. Padilla has
established a violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, § 13
rights to counsel. Therefore, the order denying post-conviction relief should be
reversed and relief granted. Specifically, the judgments of conviction should be
vacated and the case dismissed and Mr. Padilla should be released from custody.

V. CONCLUSION
The District Court erred in denying the petition for post-conviction relief.
This Court should reversed the District Court and grant relief.
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